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ALD-024            NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3280 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHN E. REARDON, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
MR. LEASON; MR. PFIEFFER; MR. SIMON; MR. DOUGHERTY;  
MR. MULLER;  MR. DIANO; MR. ROMANO; MR. MONDELLI;  
MR. B. DAWSON; MR. J. FARMER; MR. K. WALSHE; MR. M. KEATING; 
MR. W. SIMON; MR. A. ROSSETTI; MISS C. CAPLAN; MR. P. PORRECCA;  
MR. D. BIGLEY; MR. S. NATAL; MR. I. STEINBERG; MR. J. GREENE;  
JOHN DOE/JANE, criminal and civil docket clerks of the Camden County 
Superior Court; JOHN DOE, Internal Affairs Officer for the Sheriff’s Office 
at the Camden County Jail; OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL; the 
admissions staff, the emergency room staff, and the psychiatric crisis  
center staff; CAMDEN COUNTY GUIDANCE CENTER, and the psychiatrist 
who attempted to evaluate the plaintiff on 6/21/90; OAKRIDGE TERRACE APTS. 
owners and the “John Doe” manager of said apartments and others 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 92-cv-02433) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6(a) 
October 28, 2010 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 10, 2010 ) 
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_________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 John E. Reardon appeals the order of the District Court denying his motion 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).  We will summarily affirm.  See 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 1990, Reardon was arrested, tried and convicted in New Jersey state court after 
police found bomb construction materials at his residence.  In 1992, Reardon filed in the 
District Court a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various prosecutors, 
judges, police officers and others alleging a conspiracy to deprive him of various 
constitutional and statutory rights.  In 1994, the District Court dismissed the action for 
failure to prosecute.
1
 
 In June 2010, Reardon filed in the District Court a Rule 60(b)(4) motion requesting 
that the Court issue an order declaring that the state court lacked jurisdiction over his 
earlier criminal conviction.  He also sought permission to reinstate the § 1983 action that 
the District Court previously dismissed for failure to prosecute.  Reardon argued that as a 
result of the inappropriate and/or fraudulent actions of many of the defendants named in 
                                                 
1Reardon appealed the District Court’s determination to this Court, but the appeal was 
untimely filed and we dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.  Reardon v. Leason, No. 95-
5219 (order entered on June 9, 1995). 
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his earlier § 1983 action, the State of New Jersey was mislead into prosecuting him and 
securing a conviction and his judgment was therefore void. 
 We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  An order 
denying a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is subject to plenary review.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. 
White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 and n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Page v. Schweiker, 786 F. 2d 
150, 152 (3d Cir. 1986)).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) provides for relief when a judgment is 
void.  A judgment may be void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction over the 
subject matter or the parties, or entered a decree which was not within the powers granted 
to it by law.  See Marshall v. Board of Educ., Bergenfield, N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
 Reardon argues that the District Court erred in determining that his Rule 60(b)(4) 
motion was not filed within a reasonable time.  Indeed, this Court has stated that “no 
passage of time can render a void judgment valid, and a court may always take 
cognizance of a judgment’s void status” whenever a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is brought. 
United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc).   Nevertheless, we conclude that Reardon has not demonstrated that he is entitled 
to relief under Rule 60(b)(4).
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 We may affirm a result reached by the District Court for any reason as long as the record 
supports the judgment.  See Guthrie v. Lady JanColleries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1983). 
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 Reardon essentially sought an order from the District Court directing the state 
court to void his conviction because the state court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over his 
case.  However, as noted above, Rule 60(b)(4) provides for relief from judgment only 
when the court that rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or 
the parties.  Marshall, 575 F.2d at 422.  The District Court did not enter judgment in 
Reardon’s criminal case.3  To the extent that Reardon also sought leave from the District 
Court to reinstate his previously dismissed § 1983 complaint, such relief is not 
contemplated under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). 
 As Reardon’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  
See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Reardon’s motion to supplement the record is 
denied.  
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 Moreover, because Reardon is effectively asking the District Court to void a state court 
conviction, he is barred from doing so under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Great 
Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). 
